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WHEN GOVERNMENT EXPRESSION COLLIDES WITH
THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE

Martha McCarthy*

I. INTRODUCTION
On February 25, 2009, the United States Supreme Court
rendered its widely watched decision in Pleasant Grove City v.
Summum. 1 Unanimously reversing the opinion of the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court upheld the city's
decision to reject a religious group's request to erect a
monument in a public park even though a monument with the
Ten Commandments was already displayed. The Court
concluded that the city's decision as to which donated
monuments to display represents government expression that
is not subject to Free Speech Clause restrictions. The Court in
this case avoided addressing 1) whether a city's expression of
its own views by allowing the display of monuments with
religious content, such as the Ten Commandments, promotes
religion in violation of the Establishment Clause, and 2)
whether there is a legitimate justification for cities to display
monuments of some religious groups but not others. 2 Following
a brief introduction and review of the recent Supreme Court
decision, this article addresses the potential conflict between
the government speech doctrine and the Establishment Clause
and implications of this conflict for public schools.

* Chancellor's Professor and Chair, Educational Leadership and Policy Studies,
Indiana University.
1. 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009) [hereinafter Summum].
2. Prior to the Supreme Court's recent decision, a number of Utah cities removed
Ten Commandments monuments rather than allow the Summum to place monuments
in the parks. See Kristen Moulton, Church-State Battle Looms Over Monuments in
Parks,
SALT
LAKE
TRIB.,
Feb.
2,
2009,
available
at
http://www .scrippsnews.com/node/41282.
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A. Context and Lower Court Litigation in the Summum Case
The controversy focused on monuments in a public park in
Pleasant Grove City, which has approximately 31,000 residents
who predominantly adhere to the Mormon faith. Pleasant
Grove's Pioneer Park displays 15 monuments, 11 of which were
donated by private groups. In 1971, the city council voted to
accept a monument of the Ten Commandments from the
Fraternal Order of Eagles that had established a local chapter
in the city two years earlier. Primarily in the 1960s, the Eagles
distributed Ten Commandments monuments to more than 100
cities for the purpose of reducing juvenile delinquency by
promoting this moral code. 3 Summum, through President
Summum Ra, requested permission in 2003 to erect a
monument depicting the Seven Aphorisms of Summum to join
the Ten Commandments and other donated monuments in
Pioneer Park. Summum is a religious organization founded in
1975 as an offshoot of Christianity, and adherents claim that
their seven principles were inscribed on the first set of tablets
Moses received at Mt. Sinai before he received the Ten
Commandments. 4 In rejecting Summum's request in 2003 and
again in 2005, the city argued that only monuments related to
the city's history or donated by groups with longstanding ties
with the city were allowed to be displayed in the park and that
the Summum monument did not meet either criterion. 5
Summum brought suit in 2005, claiming a free speech right
to erect the monument in Pioneer Park. The federal district
court rejected the claim, but the Tenth Circuit reversed that
decision. 6 Considering such monument displays to be private
expression, the appeals court applied strict judicial scrutiny
and concluded that the Summum monument could not be
excluded unless there was a compelling government reason
that did not entail viewpoint discrimination. 7 The Tenth
3. The Eagles started distributing these monuments in conjunction with the
release of the Ten Commandments movie in 1956.
4. See Warren Richey, Court to Weigh Utah Sect's Monument, CHRISTIAN Sc. SCI.
MONITOR, Nov. 12, 2008, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/lll2/p03s05·
usju.html.
5. Summum. 129 S. Ct. at 1130.
6. Summum v. Pleasant Grove City, Utah, 483 F.3d 1044 (lOth Cir. 2007),
petition for rehearing en bane denied, 499 F.3d 1170 (lOth Cir. 2007), rev'd, 129 S. Ct.
1125 (2009). See also Summum v. City of Ogden, 297 F.3d 995 (lOth Cir. 2002); infra
text accompanying note 28.
7. Summum, 483 F.3d at 1054-55.
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Circuit considered a public park to be a public forum not only
in terms of content-based restrictions on private speech but
also on the display of permanent monuments accepted from
private donors. Finding it unlikely that the city would satisfy
strict scrutiny, the Tenth Circuit granted the requested
injunction against the city so the Summum monument could be
erected. 8

B. Supreme Court Summum Decision
The Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit's decision. 9
Writing for the unanimous Court, Justice Alito declared that
"[p]ermanent monuments displayed on public property
typically represent government speech," which is not subject to
strict scrutiny under the Free Speech Clause. 10 The Court
reasoned that the First Amendment restricts government
regulation of private speech but not government speech. 11
Recognizing that a park may constitute a public forum for
speeches and other transitory expressive activities, the
Supreme Court reasoned that forum analysis does not apply to
the erection of a permanent monument. 12
The Court concluded that when a city accepts a monument
from a private donor the monument becomes the government's
expression of its own message. Citing the International
Municipal Lawyers Association's amicus brief in Summum, the
Court noted that "[a]cross the country, 'municipalities
generally exercise editorial control over donated monuments
through prior submission requirements, design input,
requested modifications, written criteria, and legislative
approvals of specific content proposals."' 13
8. !d. at 1055.
9. Summum, 129 8. Ct. 1125.
10. !d. at 1132.
11. !d.
12. !d. at 1137. Public places, such as streets and parks, are considered a
traditional public forum for communication where content restrictions cannot be
imposed without a compelling government interest. In a nonpublic forum, such as a
public school, expression can be confined to the governmental purpose of the property.
The government can create a limited public forum for expression on public property
that otherwise would be a nonpublic forum. For a discussion of forum analysis, see
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788 (1985); Perry Educ. Ass'n
v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983); Kincaid v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 342
(6th Cir. 2001).
13. Summum, 129 8. Ct. at 1133 (quoting Brief for IMLA as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioners at 21, Summum, 129 8. Ct. 1125 (2009) (No. 07-665)).
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The Court acknowledged that a park plays an important
role in conveying a city's identity and concluded that cities can
accept monuments portraying views they want to express as
their own, while rejecting others that do not mesh with their
ideas. 14 The Court declared: "City parks-ranging from those
in small towns, like Pioneer Park in Pleasant Grove City, to
those in major metropolises, like Central Park in New York
City-commonly play an important role in defining the identity
that the city projects to its own residents and to the outside
world." 15 Essentially, the government has the right to "speak
for itself' and to "say what it wishes." 16 The Court recognized
that public parks may provide soapboxes for a range of
speakers, but that it would be unrealistic to open parks to the
display of all monuments any person or group proposed.
However, the Court did acknowledge that government speech
is not totally unrestricted. For example, as will be discussed, it
must comply with the First Amendment's Establishment
Clause even though the Court was not asked to address this
topic in Summum. 17

C. Concurring Decisions
Four concurring opinions were written to express support
for the Court's holding but with slightly different reasoning.
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg, voiced displeasure
with the relatively new government speech doctrine and urged
the Court to avoid any expansion of this doctrine. But he
concluded that this case does not represent such an expansion
since there is "no retaliation for, or coercion of, private speech"
or the likelihood that the government will "be able to avoid
political accountability for the views that it endorses or
expresses through this means." 18 Justice Stevens further
emphasized that the Constitution's other prohibitions,
including those in the Establishment and Equal Protection

14. Id. at 1131, 1134.
15. Id. at 1133-34.
16. Id. at 1131 (citations omitted).
17. Id. at 1132. In his concurring opinion, Justice Souter emphasized that the
Establishment Clause issue was not briefed nor argued before the Supreme Court.
Summum's appeal was based solely on the Free Speech Clause. See id. at 1141 (Souter,
J., concurring); see also infra note 28.
18. Id. at 1139 (Stevens & Ginsburg, JJ., concurring).
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Clauses, ensure that the government does not have "free
license to communicate offensive or partisan messages." 19
In the second concurrence, Justice Breyer interpreted the
government speech doctrine more expansively. He cautioned
that the government speech doctrine should not be viewed as a
rigid category, but instead, the purpose of the doctrine must be
considered and not just the labels such as "government speech"
or "public forum." 20
In the third concurrence, Justice Scalia, joined by Justice
Thomas, wrote separately to mention the Establishment
Clause issue even though it was not addressed in the Court's
opinion. Justice Scalia noted that this "case has been litigated
in the shadow of the First Amendment's Establishment
Clause." 21 He relied on the Supreme Court's 2005 decision,
upholding the display of a Ten Commandments monument on
the Texas capitol grounds, as substantiating that the Ten
Commandments have an historical meaning that insulates
such monuments from an Establishment Clause challenge. 22
In the final concurrence, Justice Souter accepted the
government speech doctrine but noted that its interaction with
the Establishment Clause has not yet been sufficiently
explored and may be difficult to reconcile. 23 He opined that if
all monuments are viewed as government speech and some
have religious overtones, then the Establishment Clause may
be implicated. 24 He proposed adopting a "reasonable observer"
standard, which is similar to that used to assess whether the
government is endorsing religion. 25 Under this standard, the
central question is whether a reasonable observer would view
the monuments as government expression instead of private
speech that is merely allowed on public land. If so, the
expression would represent the government and would be
shielded from strict scrutiny under the Free Speech Clause.

19. /d.

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Td. at 1140 (Breyer, J., concurring).

/d.
/d.
/d.
/d.
/d.

at
at
at
at
at

1139 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., concurring).
1140 (citing Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005)).
1141 (Souter, J., concurring only in judgment).
1141-42.
1142.

118

B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL

[2010

II. CAN THE GOVERNMENT SPEECH DOCTRINE BE RECONCILED
WITH ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE PROHIBITIONS?

The government speech doctrine has an intuitive appeal. It
is logical for the government to be able to speak for itself
without being subjected to strict scrutiny under the Free
Speech Clause. 26 The government at times takes positions (e.g.,
stealing is bad; teenage alcohol use should be curtailed) or
promotes subjects that it feels are in the best interests of the
citizenry (e.g., the elimination of child abuse). It would be
difficult for the government to function properly without the
protection of perspectives it wants to promote in the interest of
the general welfare.

A. Government Versus Private Expression
Several federal appellate courts have applied a four-factor
test to evaluate whether expression should be considered
government speech. Under this test, consideration is given to
(1) the central purpose of the expression, (2) the extent that the
municipality exerts editorial control, (3) the speaker's identity,
and (4) whether the municipality has final authority for the
content of the expression. 27 In Summum v. City of Ogden, the
Tenth Circuit applied these four factors in finding a Ten
Commandments monument in a public park and a proposed
Summum monument for the park to be private, not
government, speech. 28 Accordingly, the court reasoned that the

26. In Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550 (2005), two associations of
beef producers and some individuals asserted that television ads were private speech
because they were funded through compelled assessments of beef producers and the
government solicited assistance from the Cattleman's Beef Promotion and Research
Board in developing the ads. Disagreeing, the Supreme Court held that the ads were
government speech because the message was controlled by the government in that the
Secretary of Agriculture had final approval.
27. See Ariz. Life Coal., Inc. v. Stanton, 515 F.::ld 956, 964 (9th Cir. 2008); Wells v.
City and County of Denver, 257 F.3d 1132, 1141 (lOth Cir. 2001); Knights of the Ku
Klux Klan v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 203 F.3d 1085, 1093-94 (8th Cir. 2000); see also
Mary Jean Dolan, Why Monuments are Government Speech: The Hard Case of Pleasant
Grove City v. Summum, 58 CATH. U. L. REV. 7, 32 (2008).
28. 297 F.3d 995, 1004-05 (lOth Cir. 2002). In finding the Ten Commandments
monument to be private speech, the appeals court focused on the purpose of the
monument-to advance the donor's viewpoint that the Ten Commandments provide an
appropriate moral code for youth to adopt. The court also reasoned that the city had no
editorial control over the content because the monument was presented as a finished
product. This decision motivated Summum to rely on the Free Speech Clause in the
claim involving Pleasant Grove City.
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city could not discriminate against selected private religious
perspectives in authorizing which monuments to display.
The Tenth Circuit espoused similar reasoning in the recent
Summum case, but the Supreme Court disagreed, finding the
decision to display monuments in a city park to be protected
government expression. 29 As discussed, government expression
is not subjected to strict scrutiny, but the U.S. Constitution
does place restrictions on government speech that are not
placed on private expression. Paramount among these is that
government expression cannot blatantly discriminate against
certain perspectives or promote religious tenets. Whereas
private religious expression is protected by the Free Speech
Clause, the Establishment Clause prohibits the government
from promoting religion.

B. Public Monuments as Government Expression
Interpreting the government speech doctrine in connection
with monuments on public property, the Supreme Court has
reasoned that when the public entity accepts a private donation
it assumes ownership of the message as well as the physical
monument that is permanently displayed. 30 Thus, monuments
in city parks convey the government's views, and the general
citizenry sees the government as the speaker. If a public park
instead were considered a public forum where viewpoint
discrimination is barred when deciding which monuments to
display, the city would not be able to shape its parks to reflect
local values.
The government makes choices in expressing its ideas, and
there is always some element of viewpoint discrimination in
such decisions. For example, when a school board decides who
will be the graduation speaker, many possible speakers are
excluded from consideration. 31 Also, when public libraries
decide to purchase certain books, they are not selecting many
others. Similarly, the government must be able to select certain
monuments for its parks; it cannot accept all that are proposed
because there simply would not be enough space, and having
too many monuments might defeat the park's purpose. Jay
29. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1132-33.
30. See Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1134; see also Dolan, supra note 27.
31. Alan Brownstein, The Nonforum as a First Amendment Category: Bringing
Order Out of Chaos of Free Speech Cases Inuoluing School-Sponsored Activities, 542
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 717, 737-38 (2009).
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Sekulow, in his brief for Pleasant Grove City, stated that
"[a]ccepting a Statue of Liberty does not compel a government
to accept a Statue of Tyranny." 32 As noted previously, the Court
in Summum agreed that most cities exert control over the form
and content of donated monuments through guidelines they
promulgate or through a required approval process. 33 The
Court has recognized that when the government is promoting
its own policies it has latitude in designing its message and "it
may take legitimate and appropriate steps to ensure that its
message is neither garbled nor distorted." 34

C. Can Religious Views Be Government Expression?
The primary unresolved issue after the Supreme Court's
2009 Summum decision is how the acceptance of some religious
monuments and the rejection of others can comply with the
Establishment Clause if such acceptance conveys the views of
the government. The attorney representing Summum, Brian
Barnard, has amended the lawsuit in federal court, focusing
the new claim on the Establishment Clause. Voicing optimism
that he will be successful in challenging the differential
treatment of the
Seven Aphorisms and
the Ten
Commandments under the Establishment Clause, he has
asserted that given the Supreme Court's decision, "it's like they
are handing it to me on a silver platter." 35 If a city's decision to
accept or reject donated monuments is government speech,
then how can a municipality allow either a Ten
Commandments monument or one with the Summum's Seven
Aphorisms, since both promote religious tenets on behalf of the
city?
The government is prohibited by the Free Speech Clause
from discriminating against private religious views, but the
government itself cannot endorse religious messages. 36 Stated
another way, Ian Bartrum has asserted that Justices "Scalia
and Thomas cannot have their constitutional cake and eat it

32. Brief for the Petitioners at 2, Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009) (No. 07-665).
33. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1133 (citing Brief for IMLA as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioners at 21; Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009) (No. 07-665)).
34. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors ofUniv. ofVa., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995).
35. Moulton, supra note 2.
36. See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001); Rosenberger v.
Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr.
Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
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too: If there is room at the public forum for the Good News
Club, there must also be room for Summum." 37 Thus, the park
is either a forum for expression where viewpoint discrimination
would not be allowed, or the monuments are government
expression, which is restricted by the Establishment Clause. It
is difficult to argue that Pleasant Grove City's action speaks for
the government AND complies with the Establishment Clause.
The American Humanist Association contends that the
Summum decision provides a vehicle to use the Establishment
Clause in requiring the removal of all Ten Commandments
monuments from public property. 38 Justice Souter, in his
Summum concurrence, recognized that the Establishment
Clause issues were not raised in this case and that "the
interaction between the 'government speech doctrine' and
Establishment Clause principles has not yet begun to be
worked out." 39 And he noted that it "may not be easy to work
out," 40 which is an understatement indeed.
Justice Scalia, in his Summum concurrence is the only
justice who directly addressed the Establishment Clause issue,
and he quickly rejected the concern. He opined that "[t]he city
ought not fear that today's victory has propelled it from the
Free Speech Clause frying pan into the Establishment Clause
fire." 41 He contended that the Ten Commandments can
legitimately be displayed because they have historical
significance in addition to their religious meaning. But on other
occasions, he has stated that the government can even promote
biblical monotheism without implicating the Establishment
Clause, 42 which the Supreme Court has rejected in a number of
decisions. 43
Since the foundation of the government speech doctrine is
that the government controls its message, a "constitutional

37. Ian Bartrum, Pleasant Grove v. Summum: Losing the Battle to Win the War,
95 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 43, at 46 (2009).
38. See Brief for American Humanist Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Neither Party, Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009) (No. 07-665).
39. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1141 (Souter, J., concurring).
40. ld.
41. ld. at 1139 (Scalia, & Thomas, JJ., concurring).
42. McCreary County, Ky. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 891-94 (2005) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); see also Dolan, supra note 27, at 48 n.232.
43. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 305 (2000); Lee v.
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 589 (1992); Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203, 220 ( 1963).

122

B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL

[2010

conundrum" presents itself whenever this doctrine is applied to
religious speech. 44 And the display of a permanent monument
with religious content differs from a public official making a
religious reference in a speech. Not only is a speech transient,
but also the public realizes that the speaker is expressing
personal views. In contrast, a monument that is permanently
displayed gives a "collective statement of government
approval." 45

D. Are the Ten Commandments Secular?
The only way to avoid an Establishment Clause violation
would be to consider the religious monument to be primarily
historical and secular, rather than sectarian. Calling this "a
flimsy doctrine fraught with peril," Bartrum has contended
that "it transparently prefers well established or 'historically
significant' religions-likely to be local majorities-to newer
minority groups." 46
The Supreme Court seemingly settled the religious nature
of the Ten Commandments in Stone v. Graham when it struck
down a state's efforts to post the Ten Commandments in public
school classrooms. 47 The Court was not persuaded that the
constitutional violation was reduced by purchasing the copies
with private donations and including the following notation on
each copy: "The secular application of the Ten Commandments
is clearly seen in its adoption as the fundamental legal code of
Western Civilization and the Common Law of the United
States." 48 The Court recognized that the first three
commandments outline duties of believers toward God so they
cannot be viewed as a secular code of conduct. The Court
declared that "[t]he Ten Commandments are undeniably a
sacred text in the Jewish and Christian faiths, and no
legislative recitation of a supposed secular purpose can blind us
to that fact." 49

44. Dolan, supra note 27, at 48.
45. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 723 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
46. Bartrum, supra note 37, at 47.
47. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam).
48. KY. REV. STAT.§ 158.178 (1980).
49. Stone, 449 U.S. at 41. The Court further stated that posting the
Commandments was designed "to induce the schoolchildren to read, meditate upon,
perhaps to venerate and obey, the Commandments." ld. at 42.
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Even when the splintered Supreme Court in 2005 upheld
the display of a donated Ten Commandments monument 50 on
the Texas state capitol grounds in Van Orden v. Perry, the
Court indicated that Stone was still good law. 51 And on the
same day that Van Orden was rendered, the Court in another
divided ruling struck down the display of the Ten
Commandments in Kentucky county courthouses, finding the
displays designed to promote religion. 52
Nonetheless, the five-member Van Orden majority found
the display of the Ten Commandments monument on the Texas
state capitol grounds to be a far more passive use of the
religious document than when the Ten Commandments are
displayed in public schools. 53 Because the state had accepted
monuments representing several aspects of the state's political
and legal history and the Ten Commandments were found to
have historical as well as religious significance, the Van Orden
majority could not conclude that the display of the Ten
Commandments monument violated the Establishment Clause.
However, the four dissenting justices in Van Orden strongly
disagreed, noting that "the sole function of the monument on
the grounds of Texas's State Capitol is to display the full text of

50. See supra text accompanying note 3 for a discussion of monuments donated by
the Fraternal Order of Eagles.
51. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 690·91.
52. McCreary County, Ky. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005); see also Baker v. Adams
County/Ohio Valley Sch. Bd., 86 Fed. Appx. 104 (6th Cir. 2004) (finding an
unconstitutional religious purpose in displaying the Ten Commandments on the
grounds of new high schools, noting that other historical monuments were added to the
displays only after the religious monuments were legally challenged); ACLU v. City of
Plattsmouth, 358 F.3d 1020 (8th Cir. 2004) (fmding religious motives in the city's
accepting and maintaining a Ten Commandments monument); Books v. Elkhart, 235
F.3d 292 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding a Ten Commandments monument in front of a
municipal building to be an unconstitutional establishment of religion). In supporting
the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in Books, Justice Stevens declared that the
first line of the monument's inscription (I am the Lord thy God) could not possibly he
defended as religiously neutral. Books, cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1058 (2001).
53. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 678; see also ACLU Neb. Found. v. City of
Plattsmouth, 419 F.3d 772 (8th Cir. 2005) (en bane) (upholding a Ten Commandments
display in a public park as recognizing the role of God and religion in our nation's
history); Freethought Society v. Chester County, 334 F.3d 247 (3d Cir. 2003)
(upholding the display of the Ten Commandments on a plaque attached to a county
courthouse because it is viewed as an historical artifact); Summum v. City of Ogden,
297 F.3d 995 (lOth Cir. 2002) (finding no Establishment Clause violation in the display
of a Ten Commandments monument and the proposed display of a Summum
monument in a city park since both entailed private expression); supra text
accompanying note 28.
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one version of the Ten Commandments." 54 Justice Stevens
contended that by choosing one version, the selection put the
state in the middle of a sectarian dispute. 55 He further faulted
the majority for condoning the promotion of a code of conduct
through biblical teachings, which "injects a religious purpose
into an otherwise secular endeavor." 56 He declared that "[i]f a
state may endorse a particular deity's command to 'have no
other gods before me,' it is difficult to conceive of any textual
display that would run afoul of the Establishment Clause." 57
The Van Orden dissenters argued that the state could honor
the Fraternal Order of Eagles for its efforts to combat juvenile
delinquency without using a religious medium. Justice Stevens
observed that there was no connection between the Ten
Commandments monument and the state's history or any
individual or group; instead, any reasonable observer would
view the monument as state endorsement of Judea-Christian
religion. He asserted: "This Nation's resolute commitment to
neutrality with respect to religion is flatly inconsistent with the
plurality's wholehearted validation of an official state
endorsement of the message that there is one, and only one,
God." 58
If the Establishment Clause demands neutrality, then the
government cannot advance any religious faith, despite Justice
Scalia's contention that monotheism can be promoted. 59 The
state clearly cannot privilege those religious sects that are
based on a belief in God. 60 The Supreme Court also has
recognized that individuals have the right to select any religion
or none at all. 61
It is difficult to argue that the government is not embracing
the majority religion when it displays a monument of the Ten
Commandments. Does the Supreme Court's decision in
Summum stand for the premise that the government can
promote Judea-Christian religious views but it can reject the
views of other "fringe religions," as they do not convey tenets
54. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 707 (Stevens, & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
55. Id. at 718-19.
56. ld. at 715.
57. Id. at 735.
58. Id. at 712.
59. McCreary County, Ky. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 891-94 (2005) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); see supra text accompanying note 42.
60. See, e.g., Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961).
61. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 52-53 (1985).
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that the government embraces? 62 The American Jewish
Committee, Americans United for Separation of Church and
State, and several other groups, in an amicus brief in
Summum, argued that the case should be litigated under
Establishment Clause principles because the Summum
actually are claiming that the city acted with religious hostility
in refusing to display the monument. 63 Assuming that
monuments in public parks represent the views of the
government, additional ammunition is provided for a successful
Establishment Clause suit if any of the monuments are
religious in nature. Chief Justice Roberts even recognized this
dilemma during the Summum oral arguments: "You're really
just picking your poison. . . the more you say that the
monument is Government speech to get out of the ... Free
Speech Clause, the more it seems to me you're walking into a
trap under the Establishment Clause. If it's Government
speech, it may not present a free speech problem, but what is
the Government doing speaking-supporting the Ten
Commandments?" 64

III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE SUMMUM DECISION FOR PUBLIC
SCHOOLS

At first blush, it may appear that the implications of the
Summum ruling for public education are minimal. The most
apparent connection is in interpreting free speech guarantees.
When public schools are speaking as the government, they are
not subject to Free Speech Clause scrutiny. In a nonpublic
forum, such as a public school, the government daily makes
decisions regarding the curriculum to adopt, books to use, and
speakers to invite that preclude consideration of other topics,
materials, and individuals. The recent attention given the
government speech doctrine has not changed the legal
principles applied in assessing the public school's expression of
its own messages.

62. Dolan, supra note 27, at 49.
63. American Jewish Committee, Americans United for Separation of Church and
State, Anti-Defamation League, Baptist Joint Committee for Religious Liberty, and
People for the American Way Foundation as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party,
Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009) (No. 07-665).
64. Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009) (No. 07665).
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However, one could argue that the recently articulated
government speech doctrine may strengthen, and perhaps even
expand, the principle enunciated in Hazelwood School District
u. Kuhlmeier. 65 The Supreme Court in Hazelwood announced
that expression representing the public school can be curtailed
for legitimate pedagogical reasons. But the Hazelwood
principle was alive and well before the government speech
doctrine became prominent. It is not likely that public schools
have more latitude using the government expression rationale
than they already have under Hazelwood, a decision that has
been expansively interpreted as covering both employee and
student expression that bears the imprimatur of K-12 public
schools or state-supported postsecondary institutions. 66
The major implication of the Summum decision for public
schools may be a subtle one, assuming that the Supreme Court
continues to uphold Ten Commandments displays in city parks,
while at the same time allowing cities to reject monuments
from other religious groups. This may provide an incentive for
public schools to further accommodate the dominant religious
faith in their communities. For example, they may conclude
that bricks donated for a public school sidewalk can include
religious messages supported by the majority of the
community, such as references to God, because such messages
are considered the school's expressiOn and convey that
historically our nation's citizenry has professed a belief m
God. 67 Public schools may interpret the Summum decision as
65. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
66. See, e.g., Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d 939 (9th Cir. 2002) (applying Hazelwood to a
university's assessment of a student's academic performance); Henerey v. City of St.
Charles Sch. Dist., 200 F.3d 1128 (8th Cir. 1999) (upholding disqualification of student
council candidate who handed out condoms with stickers bearing his campaign slogan);
Miles v. Denver Pub. Schs., 944 F.2d 773 (lOth Cir. 1991) (upholding disciplinary
action against a teacher who made comments during class about rumors that two
students had engaged in sexual intercourse on school grounds during the lunch hour);
Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066 (llth Cir. 1991) (upholding a university's order to a
professor to keep religious beliefs out of the classroom).
67. Courts to date have rendered conflicting rulings on requests to include
religious messages on bricks purchased for school walkways or on tiles hung at school.
See, e.g., Fleming v. Jefferson County Sch. Dist., 298 F.3d 918 (lOth Cir. 2002)
(upholding school authorities in barring religious messages on tiles to be hung at school
because such expression represents the school and sectarian tiles would promote
religion in violation of the Establishment Clause); Kiesinger v. Mex. Acad. & Cent.
Sch., 427 F. Supp. 2d 182 (N.D.N.Y. 2006) (finding viewpoint discrimination in
removing from the school walkway donated bricks with references to Jesus since
secular references were allowed); Seidman v. Paradise Valley Unified Sch. Dist. No. 69,
327 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (D. Ariz. 2004) (finding viewpoint discrimination in the school
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giving them more autonomy in determining what perspectives
they will project.
Public schools in some locales might even resurrect efforts
to display the Ten Commandments on school grounds,
contending that such displays are permissible government
speech. It would appear that if a Ten Commandments
monument in a city park is permissible because it reflects the
government's views and does not run afoul of the
Establishment Clause due to its historical significance, the Ten
Commandments could be displayed in public schools as well.
Why would such displays abridge the Establishment Clause
only in certain settings? Is the historical and secular
significance of the Ten Commandments lessened when posted
in public schools? 68 The argument used to justify the secular
nature of the Ten Commandments does not seem context
specific. The emphasis given to government expression and the
types of speech it protects could alter how public schools
respond in certain situations until the intersection of the
government speech doctrine with the Establishment Clause IS
resolved by the Supreme Court.

IV. Conclusion
Government-commissioned monuments can speak for the
government but so can privately funded monuments that the
government accepts as donations. Few fault the utility of this
strategy. Under the government speech doctrine, a
municipality accepts selected monuments so it can project a
particular image to all who visit the park, and the expression
then becomes that of the government entity. 69 The argument
developed here is that a government unit, whether a city or
public school, cannot use "historical acceptance" or "ties to the
allowing parents to purchase tiles for school walls with motivational phrases but not
religious references).
68. Granted, courts traditionally have been particularly protective of public school
students in applying the Establishment Clause, but some recent decisions have
preferred Free Speech Clause analysis to bar governmental discrimination against
private religious expression. See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S.
98 (2001) (allowing a Christian organization to hold meetings in a public school right
after classes end even though the evangelical club targets elementary-agP. children
attending the school); Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990) (rejecting an
Establishment Clause challenge to the Equal Access Act that allows student religious
clubs to meet in federally assisted secondary schools that have created a forum for
student groups to meet during noninstructional time).
69. Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1134.
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community" rationales to accept a monument from a religious
group it favors and reject a monument from a religious group it
does not support. Otherwise, as Justice Stevens has noted, "[i]t
would replace Jefferson's 'wall of separation' with a perverse
wall of exclusion-Christians inside, non-Christians out." 70 If
the government speech doctrine is dominant and overrides the
Establishment Clause, "[t]his makes a mockery of the
constitutional ideal that government must remain neutral
between religion and irreligion." 71 It seems inevitable that the
United States Supreme Court will have to address the collision
of the Establishment Clause and the government speech
doctrine in the near future.

70. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 730 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 735. The concept of governmental neutrality toward religion has
changed since first addressed in the mid.twentieth century. Initially, neutrality meant
complete separation of church and state: "Neither a state nor the Federal government
can ... pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over
another." Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947). Now, the concept of neutrality
has a more accommodationist connotation, often cloaked in terms of private religious
expression protected by the Free Speech Clause. See Good News Club v. Milford Cent.
Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001); Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors, 515 U.S. 819 (1995); see
also Bartrum, supra note 37.

